Employment Arbitration Agreements – Enforceable? Desirable?

A relatively new trend has emerged, whereby employers are attempting to limit the expense and exposure of wrongful termination actions by requiring that all employees sign arbitration agreements. I am frequently asked by employers whether they should adopt such an approach. Before turning to that question, let’s dispel some of the myths about arbitration.

Arbitration is not Mediation

I find that when many people use the term arbitration, they are really thinking of a procedure more akin to mediation. For example, in those case where an arbitration clause is in place, the client is often surprised when I begin talking in terms of gathering evidence and witnesses and preparing for the arbitration. Without having actually thought it through, they somehow thought that the arbitration agreement would avoid all of the traditional methods of proof. When I dig deeper, I find that they envisioned a meeting between the parties, where the arbitrator would listen to both sides, and then either issue a King Solomon-like proclamation, or persuade the parties to enter into a mutually acceptable settlement agreement.

Arbitration is best thought of as a trial proceeding in a different forum. The rules of that forum are defined by the parties and/or the arbitration agreement. For instance, if the agreement provides that the arbitration will be conducted by the American Arbitration Association, then the rules of that organization will apply. Issues such as whether the parties are free to bring motions, take depositions, and conduct written discovery are all determined by the rules agreed to. Arbitration can be every bit as involved as traditional litigation, which leads to the next point:

Arbitration is not Always a Cheaper Alternative to Litigation

In most cases, arbitration can be a less expensive alternative to litigation, but that is by no means always the case. Often, an arbitration clause can add a new level of complication and expense to a case. In the employment context, for example, an employee will often argue that the arbitration agreement is unenforceable or does not apply to the causes of action being pursued. When that occurs, the parties will find themselves in court fighting over that issue. Or what if one of the parties simply refuses to cooperate in the process? Then you must either petition the court to compel arbitration, ignore the arbitration provision and go to court (only to have the other side then invoke the arbitration provision), or proceed with the arbitration without the other party, and run the risk that the court may later disagree with your assessment that the arbitration provision was enforceable. Other times the situation will arise where there are necessary parties to the action that are not parties to the arbitration agreement. You then end up with a situation where one or more parties to the arbitration agreement insist on proceeding under that agreement, while the non-parties refuse to stipulate to do so. This can result in the worst of all worlds – the time and expense of litigating the action in both forums.

Even if things go as planned, arbitration can be very expensive. In a court trial, the parties must pay their attorneys, and perhaps some incidental expenses such as court reporter fees. In an arbitration, the parties must also pay the arbitrator and the arbitration service. A five day arbitration will easily exceed $24,000, and that is just for the time spent at arbitration – it does not include any of the preparation time. And that figure is based on a single arbitrator. Often, in an effort to avoid a groundless decision that might be rendered by a single arbitrator, arbitration agreements provide for a panel of three arbitrators. Obviously, such an agreement carries with it a much higher cost for the arbitration.

Conceptually, arbitration should be more expensive than litigation because it adds the expense of the arbitration service and the arbitrator(s). The only reason that arbitration is usually cheaper than litigation is because of the options it eliminates. For example, if the rules provide for only limited discovery and do not permit motions, then those costs are eliminated. You must decide, however, if you want to have an employment dispute decided without all of the tools available.

Giving Up the Protections of the Court is Not Always Desirable

Judges and arbitrators are all capable of rendering completely baseless decisions. So, the first question is, who is more likely to render what you consider to be the proper decision? And if you decide to place your confidence in an arbitrator or arbitrators, are you willing to live with the fact that there will be no mechanism for appeal (depending on the agreement and your jurisdiction)?

Some war stories will illustrate how scary it can be to give up your right of appeal. In a case I recently handled, the parties were ordered by the court to non-binding arbitration. We represented an investment advisor who, along with his partner, had handled an investment for the partner’s daughter. When the investment did not do as well as hoped (although the investors did not lose any money), the daughter sued our client for negligent misrepresentation, ignoring the fact that her own father had recommended the investment, and that our client had invested far more than she had. The plaintiff’s case was ridiculous, and she ultimately dismissed the case to avoid a suit for malicious prosecution. But before the dismissal, at the court-ordered non-binding arbitration, the result was far different.

After the arbitration had concluded and the parties were leaving, the arbitrator asked the plaintiff if our client had ever given her a printed disclosure statement regarding any commissions he would receive from the investment. She answered that while she knew that her father and our client were both receiving commissions, and that she knew the amount (her father had rebated his commission to her), she did not recall if she had ever received a formal written statement. I protested this “in the hall” testimony, and said that if the arbitrator was going to consider this (seemingly innocuous) statement by the plaintiff, he would have to afford me the opportunity to elicit testimony from my client on this point. The arbitrator answered that no testimony from my client would be needed, since there was clearly not any problem with the disclosure.

I was flabbergasted when the arbitrator’s decision arrived a few days later. He had properly found that there had not been any misrepresentations made to the plaintiff, but based on his own research on disclosure laws – an issue that was not raised in the complaint or had ever been advanced by the plaintiff – he awarded damages based on the alleged failure of our client to give the plaintiff a written statement. Not only was that not a reasonable basis for an award, given that the plaintiff herself had testified that she was fully informed of the commission amounts, if the arbitrator had permitted our client to testify on this point, he would have learned that the plaintiff had been provided with a written statement.

This was all just a pointless exercise in any event since the arbitration was non-binding, but imagine if it had been binding, with no avenue for appeal. This is just one example, but at my firm we have experienced several arbitration decisions that were nearly as arbitrary and had no resemblance to the ultimate determination in the case.

In one of my favorite examples, in a case not involving my firm, an attorney advised his client in the strongest possible terms not to pursue a very risky business venture. When the client insisted, the attorney reluctantly agreed to help him with the legal aspects of the venture, but in the fee agreement, which contained an arbitration provision, the attorney had the client sign and acknowledge in 20 different places that he was proceeding with the venture against the specific advice of his attorney. When the venture failed, the client sued the attorney, claiming that he had not adequately disclosed the risky nature of the venture. The arbitrator agreed, stating that the 20 disclaimers in the fee agreement only served to illustrate that the attorney knew this was a risky venture, and “should not have permitted the client to go forward.” The attorney was ordered to reimburse the client for the money lost in the venture, as well as to pay emotional distress damages. Had there been no arbitration clause in the agreement, the attorney could have appealed this foolish decision, but as it was he was bound by it.

Are Employment Agreements that Require Arbitration Enforceable?

If you still feel the benefits of arbitration outweigh the negative aspects, the next issue is whether an arbitration agreement can be drafted that will be enforceable. There are two forces at work that are competing to establish the law in that area. The courts and lawmakers have long favored arbitration clauses as a means to keep civil disputes off the court dockets, and employment agreements have not been an exception. On the other hand, government agencies such as the EEOC, and the plaintiff’s bar, have argued that in the employment context, arbitration clauses are seldom the product of an arm’s-length agreement, and therefore amount to contracts of adhesion. (Indeed, the plaintiff’s bar has supported legislation in California (AB574) that would make it a violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act to require an employee to consent to arbitration.)

This latter position has found an ear in the courts. In Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., the arbitration agreement used by the company was found to be unenforceable because it not only prevented the employees from seeking damages that would normally be recoverable for wrongful termination, such as punitive damages and attorney fees, it permitted the company to sue its employees in court if it suspected them of unfair competition or disclosing confidential information. Normally, parties can agree to whatever they want, so long as it is not illegal, and on that level, there was nothing improper about the one-sided nature of the Supercuts employment agreement. But in the employment context, where the employer and employee have always been assumed to be at disparate bargaining positions, the court found this agreement to be unenforceable because it could not be viewed as having been arrived at through mutual assent.

Thus, when drafting an arbitration agreement, an employer and its counsel must be ever mindful of whether the agreement is fair and even-handed, and whether it can be reasonably argued that the employee voluntarily and knowingly agreed to the arbitration agreement.

Showing that the employee “knowingly” entered into the agreement has split into two different interpretations by the courts. This is really just an issue of informed consent, and the courts have split on whether words are sufficient to inform someone of any rights they are waiving, or if they must be given and understand actual examples of that they are waiving. With this split, it is far better to err on the side of too much disclosure. Employees should sign a separate arbitration agreement (language in a handbook will almost certainly be found insufficient) that enumerates and specifies each of the federal and state provisions they will be waiving right to trial under.

In the case of union agreements, all the disclosure in the world may not save an arbitration clause. An individual union member enjoys the benefits of the collective bargaining agreement, but it certainly cannot be argued that he or she made an individual waiver of the right to trial. Further, having been forced into arbitration, it cannot be said that even that procedure will be conducted in the best interests of the worker. As the court held in Buckley v. Gallo Sales Co. (N.D. Cal. 1996) 949 F. Supp. 737, “when a union represents an individual in arbitration proceedings, it has to consider the interests of all of its members, which may be in conflict with the individual.”

Finally, the agreement should merely be an alternative means to resolve the dispute, not an attempt to limit the exposure of the employer. It is very tempting to insert a provision that the arbitrator may not award punitive damages, or that the damages may not exceed one year’s wages, but these provisions are contrary to the law. They will be red flags that the employer was not just trying to find a more equitable and efficient way to resolve the dispute, but rather was trying to strip the employee of certain rights.

Conclusion

Should employers utilize arbitration agreements? In my opinion, no. But that is based in part on the billing practices of my own firm. For our clients, the cost of litigating a matter is not so much higher than the cost of arbitrating it so as to warrant giving up all of the benefits of a court. (See profile.) If you are using a traditional law firm with its concomitant billing practices, you will need to do your own cost analysis.

Further, we have found that with a strategic defense strategy, many cases can be disposed of early in the action by way of a motion for summary judgment. With an arbitration agreement, every dispute must follow the course of the complete arbitration. With court cases, there are several “escape methods” that would be forfeited with arbitration.

Finally, we have witnessed too many arbitrary decisions by arbitrators. Despite all of the uncertainty of a jury, I would prefer to rely on the good, common sense of twelve jurors as opposed to the singular decisions of sometimes officious arbitrators. Jurors will sometimes come out of left field on a factual issue, but you can be fairly confident that the matter will be decided primarily on the facts. Conversely, as illustrated by the example of the investor, arbitrators sometimes assume the role of a third advocate, and will add legal issues that neither side was concerned with, and decide the case on that basis. This is exacerbated by the fact that arbitration services group their arbitrators according to their prior experience. For example, the panel of arbitrators offered in an employment case will be primarily attorneys and judges that have a level of expertise in that area of the law.

For all of these reasons, except in those cases where the employer is located in a jurisdiction where it would likely be faced with an ultra-liberal jury, I recommend against arbitration clauses in employment agreements. There is, however, one hybrid arrangement that might be worth considering. Some companies use employment agreements that mandate that any employment disputes must first be submitted to arbitration before a three arbitrator panel, and that either party may reject the findings of the arbitrators within 30 days. Although this approach has never been challenged in the courts, it appears that it would withstand scrutiny. It should not be deemed to be an improper waiver of the employee’s right to trial since the employee is not waiving that right. He or she is always free to go to court, so long as the matter is arbitrated first. This is no different than every collective bargaining agreement that sets forth a process that must be exhausted before an employee can resort to the courts.

True, the company could be made to arbitrate a matter only to then be dragged into court, but the effective result has been that, faced with the up-front costs of the arbitration, the employees and their attorneys have been discouraged from pursuing frivolous suits. There are, unfortunately, a large number of attorneys that will file a complaint on almost any theory, with the hope that they can then extract some sort of “nuisance-value” settlement. Faced with having to finance and complete an arbitration before having access to the courts, many of these attorneys will suddenly have an epiphany as to the merits of the case.

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Aaron Morris is a Partner with the law firm of Morris & Stone, LLP, located in Tustin, Orange County, California. He can be reached at (714) 954-0700, or by email.  The practice areas of Morris & Stone include employment law (wrongful termination, sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination), business litigation (breach of contract, trade secret, partnership dissolution, unfair business practices, etc.), real estate and construction disputes, first amendment law, Internet law, discrimination claims, defamation suits, and legal malpractice.

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Ignoring Contractual ADR Requirements Can Cost Dearly

Judges hate trials.  Every minute a judge spends on a trial is a minute he or she can’t spend on other matters.  In fact, many judges will punish the attorneys if they don’t resolve the matter prior to trial.  At the Orange County Superior Court, there used to be a well-known punishment awaiting any attorney that showed up for trial.  After “answering ready” for a trial, the attorneys would be sent out into the hall to wait for a courtroom.  For days.  The attorneys were not permitted to leave, although some of the kinder judges would allow them to do their time in the courthouse’s cafeteria.  After two to three days, depending on the whim of the judge, the trial would be continued a month or two.  The attorneys would come back and follow the same procedure.  Usually, it was on the third trip to the courthouse that a courtroom would be provided.

I offer this long-winded anecdote to put you in the proper frame of mind for the following case.

In Lange v. Shilling, Jay Lange bought a lake house from Dwight and Linda St. Peter (Peters).  The Peters were represented by Roxanne Schilling and Segerstrom Real Estate Inc. (Schilling).  The parties used a standard California residential property purchase agreement to complete the sale.  Two years later, Lange filed a complaint against the Peters and Schilling, alleging various causes of action, including failure to disclose, negligence, fraud, suppression of fact, construction problems, and misrepresentation of the lake level.

The jury found Lange was damaged only by the misrepresentations of the lake level and entered judgment in favor of Lange.  Good news for Lange, because the standard California residential property purchase agreement (hereinafter, “Standard Agreement”) contains a provision for attorney fees.  Since Lange won, he could possibly get all of his attorney fees back (or at least a prorated share, since he lost on other causes of action).  Sure enough, this point wasn’t lost on Lange’s attorney, who brought a motion for attorney fees.  The trial court awarded $80,000 in fees.

But there was a problem.  The Standard Agreement, in paragraph 17, also provides that in order to be eligible for attorney fees, the plaintiff must first “attempt mediation” before filing action.  But in fact, Lange and his counsel thought they had done so.  Initially, they could not find the sellers, so as attorneys often do, the complaint was filed just to make certain no statutes of limitation were missed.  Counsel for Lange then hired an investigator, who found the sellers two weeks later.  The sellers were then offered the choice of mediation.  The letter from counsel specifically stated, “please let me know immediately if your clients do wish to mediate; otherwise, we will assume that both parties are waiving paragraph 17 of the sales agreement in its entirety.”

By no stretch of the imagination were the sellers prejudiced by this “file now, offer mediation later” approach.  They were free to possibly avoid litigation by simply agreeing to mediate.

So how did the Court of Appeal rule?  The award of attorney fees was reversed.  Failing to follow the dictates of the contract as regards alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) was an $80,000 lesson for Lange.  The Court followed a strict interpretation.  The Standard Agreement says you must attempt mediation before filing the complaint, and that wasn’t done.  The justices that sit on the Court of Appeal are, after all, former judges who still carry their hatred for trials.  When presented with a case that will result in a ruling that takes some trials away from their brethren, how would you expect them to rule?

The specifics of this case are not as important as the larger principle.  Many contracts and statutes contain pre-litigation requirements that can have costly implications if not followed.  Before suing a governmental agency, a claim must be made.  Fail to do so, and your action will be dismissed.  Before suing a homebuilder, the homeowner must follow specified procedures, affording the builder the opportunity to repair any defects.  If the procedures are not followed to the letter, the action can be stayed.

Your attorney must check for these requirements.  At Morris & Stone, we take the time every time to confirm that no pretrial requirements have been added.  Pulling up a prior complaint to simply follow what was done last time is not sufficient.

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Six Ways to Keep Your Business Out of Court

An unplanned tour of our judicial system can be financially devastating to a business. Upon being sued, the business becomes an unwilling participant in costly and often inescapable legal proceedings.  The fact that the suit may be groundless is of little comfort. Long before any court looks at the relative merits of the plaintiff’s claims, the business will be running up legal fees answering the complaint, responding to discovery requests, attending depositions, and having its attorney attend innumerable court appearances. Some businesses end up in bankruptcy from the process alone.

While law suits are seemingly unavoidable in our litigious society, a business need not wait helplessly for the process server to arrive.  The best course of action for any business is to take affirmative steps now that will maximize the chances of avoiding a sustainable court action.

This week we look at your dealings with both prospective and current employees. And while no advice can protect you from your intentional acts, the following tips may keep your innocent acts from landing you in court.

Check your hiring procedure.

With no evil intent, many businesses adopt discriminatory hiring practices. Here is a common scenario:

You have decided that your business really needs a part-time “gofer” to run miscellaneous errands. Since the job does not pay very much and you are located near campus, you decide to run a classified ad asking for college students to apply.

Your innocent ad could lead to a suit for age discrimination. Since you have limited the possible applicants to college students, you may be creating the impression that you are discriminating against retirees, for example. You may be guilty of race discrimination as well, since the percentage of minority college students is probably not reflective of the population as a whole.

Ads that seek a “gal Friday” or “housewives looking for extra income” are equally unacceptable since they carry gender-bias overtones and thus may appear to discriminate on the basis of gender.

Just advertise the job description and let the candidates decide if they are interested. This will not only avoid claims of discrimination, it will expand your pool of qualified candidates.

Check your interviewing procedure.

Having written the perfect, nondiscriminatory job ad, don’t undue your good work once you start interviewing.

Don’t ask any question that isn’t somehow job related. Even seemingly harmless small talk during the interview can get you in trouble. For example, asking a woman about her plans for marriage and children smacks of gender discrimination. These questions are frequently asked by interviewers who are afraid the candidate will take a maternity leave right after she is trained. Just as it is usually illegal to fire a woman because she is pregnant, hiring decisions cannot be based on a woman’s intent to have children.

Even questions concerning education may be improper if the job does not require any special schooling.

To be safe, make a list of the questions you intend to ask, and then review your list to make certain all the questions are justifiable as being job related and neutral in tone.

Check your employment contracts.

Now that you’ve decided to hire someone, what are the conditions of their employment? Are they guaranteed employment for a specific period of time, or can you terminate them “at-will?” How much will they be paid? If an employee works for a commission, how are unpaid commissions handled if the employee leaves? Were any benefits promised?

If you don’t have a contract specifying these points, you may end up litigating them. As the old saw goes, “oral contracts aren’t worth the paper they’re written on.” If you’re not using employment contracts, start. Keep the agreement simple, but make sure it covers the main points.

A very important issue is the grounds for termination. Unless industry standards or corporate philosophies mandate otherwise, your employees should be terminable at-will. Absent a bad economy, no rational employer is going to fire an employee that is doing a good job. But too many employers unnecessarily limit their options by promising to keep an employee “as long as they do a good job.” That should go without saying, but having said it, at-will status may be defeated. If it later becomes necessary to fire the employee, he or she can bring an action for wrongful termination, claiming the termination was without good cause and therefore a breach of the promise not to fire.

For the same reason, don’t use a probationary period for new employees. To do so implies that the employee will obtain “permanent” status once the probationary period is over.  Keep your employees “at-will,” and make sure that status is reflected in the employment contract.

Check your employee handbook.

If your company rules and policies are set forth in a handbook, they will be considered a part of your employment contracts. It is therefore essential to make certain that the wording of your handbook isn’t negating the intent of your contracts.

Employee handbooks are fertile ground for finding that an employee cannot be terminated at-will. A recent court decision held that a basketball coach, hired on a one-year contract, could not be fired at the end of that year except for good cause. The court’s decision was based on the school’s handbook, which imposed such a condition.

If you have a handbook — follow it.

Having reviewed your company’s handbook, make sure it is followed. A common mistake is to discipline an employee without first following the review procedure contained in the employee handbook. Even if caught committing murder and mayhem, the employee is contractually entitled to whatever review process that has been established. While a snap disciplinary decision may later be vindicated, the point here is to stay out of court altogether. That can only be accomplished by following procedure, regardless of how egregious the employee’s conduct may seem.

Document, document, document.

Document all employment matters, from hiring to termination. If the day comes that you need to justify a hiring, promotion or firing, you will want written documentation to support your decision.

When hiring, be prepared to justify why you hired one candidate over another. That will require keeping on file the applications and/or resumes of all the candidates. You will be at a serious disadvantage in court if you can’t remember why you failed to hire a particular candidate.

Current employees should receive written evaluations at least every year, and any interim problems or kudos should also be documented. All evaluations should be signed by the employee, acknowledging receipt.

Supervisors understandably hate to give bad evaluations since it is confrontational and hurts morale.  But such reluctance frequently results in a file with nothing but glowing evaluations. Supervisors should always give scrupulously honest reviews.

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Aaron Morris is a Partner with the law firm of Morris & Stone, LLP, located in Tustin, Orange County, California. He can be reached at (714) 954-0700, or by email.  The practice areas of Morris & Stone include employment law (wrongful termination, sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination), business litigation (breach of contract, trade secret, partnership dissolution, unfair business practices, etc.), real estate and construction disputes, first amendment law, Internet law, discrimination claims, defamation suits, and legal malpractice.

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How to Defeat a Section 17200 Suit Before it Cripples Your Company

Section 17200 sounded good on paper.  If a business was engaging in unfair business practices, it could be sued by Joe Citizen to force the business to get back in line. Under the “Private Attorney General” approach, the plaintiff does not even need to be an injured party.  In theory, instead of relying on the limited resources of the government to root out illicit business practices, this statute would make every citizen a watchdog.

But as is often the case, a good idea can be misused.  Some unscrupulous attorneys began using Business and Professions Code section 17200 as a source of revenue.  They would file dozens of suits against businesses, based on some questionable claim of unfair business practices, then suggest to the businesses that it would be cheaper to settle the case for a few thousand dollars then to try and mount a defense.  As leverage, the attorneys would point out that if the case moved forward, the business would likely be required to participate in extensive and revealing discovery about its business practices.

It took some time, but the courts are finally recognizing these abuses and permitting business to get out before the litigation becomes costly.  Three recent decisions provide new tools for defense counsel to obtain early dismissal of “private attorney general” lawsuits brought under state Business & Professions Code Section 17200 et seq., also known as the unfair-competition law.

In Rosenbluth International Inc. v. Superior Court, 101 Cal.App.4th 1073 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. Sept. 2, 2002), the 2nd District Court of Appeal ordered the trial court to grant summary judgment to a defendant. The case otherwise would have settled or proceeded to a full-blown trial.

Even more exciting for Section 17200 defendants and their counsel, in the other two cases, Searle v. Wyndham International, 102 Cal.App.4th 1327 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. Oct. 15, 2002), and Gregory v. Albertson’s Inc., 104 Cal.App.4th 845 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. Dec. 20, 2002), the 4th District and the 1st District, respectively, took the unusual step of dismissing the cases based on the pleadings, which avoided discovery and other expensive pretrial work. Many businesses operating in the state are familiar with its unfair-competition law – and some are all too familiar.  That law allows a “private attorney general” to challenge actionable business acts or practices as “unlawful,” “unfair” or “fraudulent.”  A companion statute, Section 17500 et seq., allows private attorneys general to challenge false or fraudulent advertising.

A private attorney general may be any person, even one who has not experienced the alleged wrongful business practice.  A private attorney general may even be a for-profit corporation, formed by a plaintiffs’ firm for the express purpose of bringing suits under the state’s unfair-competition law.  The private attorney general has the ability to represent the “general public”: potentially thousands, or even millions, of people. The private attorney general may obtain an injunction, an order from the court directing a business to act or refrain from acting in a certain way, or may obtain an order that the defendant business must restore all property, usually money, that the court finds has been wrongfully obtained. A defendant business often must pay the private attorney general’s attorney fees.

Private attorney general actions therefore have the potential to threaten a business with massive financial exposure, either through restoration of thousands or millions of dollars or through the cost of complying with an injunction.  Moreover, the cases themselves are expensive to defend, because private attorneys general often demand wide-ranging discovery as a means of proving their case and ncreasing settlement pressure on the defendant business. The business not only must be concerned with state exposure but also must realize that a California court’s finding that a business has engaged in “unlawful,” “unfair” or “fraudulent” business practice could spawn copycat litigation nationwide.  For these reasons, defense counsel mustdefeat a private attorney general action as near to the beginning of the case as possible.  The Rosenbluth, Searle and Gregory decisions provide new tools to do just that. In Rosenbluth, an individual private attorney general brought an action on behalf of he general public against a travel agency serving large corporate clients, alleging that the agency used fraudulent accounting methods to understate the amount of rebates due its customers.  The agency moved for summary judgment, arguing that the private attorney general could not bring the action because the individual was not a party to any contract with the travel agency. The trial court denied the motion. Despite the rule that a private attorney general need not assert that he or she has been injured by the challenged business practice, the 2nd District disagreed with the trial court and ordered that the travel agency was entitled to summary judgment.

The Rosenbluth court based its decision on language in an earlier case decided by the state Supreme Court, Kraus v. Trinity Management Services Inc., 23 Cal.4th 116 (June 5, 2000), allowing a court to dismiss a private attorney general action if the court decides that the lawsuit “is not brought by a competent plaintiff for the benefit of injured parties.”  Rosenbluth is the first published decision to apply this language to dispose of a private attorney general claim without a full-blown trial.  The court ruled that the lawsuit was not “brought by a competent plaintiff for the benefit of injured parties” because the purported victims were Fortune 1000 companies who had negotiated individually written contracts with the travel agency. Citing two earlier cases, Prata v. Superior Court, 91 Cal.App.4th 1128 (2001) (consumer claim challenging false “same as cash” advertising), and South Bay Chevrolet v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 72 Cal.App.4th 861 (1999) (claim brought on behalf of sophisticated auto dealerships), the court essentially concluded that private attorney general actions were meant not for the protection of sophisticated business entities (who presumably can protect their own interests) but for protection of individual consumers. In Searle, the 4th District took the unusual step of dismissing a lawsuit based simply on the allegations in the complaint, with no discovery or other pretrial work.  The private attorney general in Searle had challenged the hotel’s practice of adding both a 17 percent service charge and a line where a customer could add a gratuity to bills for meals ordered from the room-service menu.  The plaintiff argued that this billing practice was both “unfair” because it compels guests to pay a gratuity and “fraudulent” because guests are not advised that the 17 percent service charge is a gratuity paid to the server.

In an unusual analysis, the 4th District relied not so much on prior cases as on such odd sources as an old Groucho Marx movie and an academic work on the history of tipping. The court rejected the plaintiff’s lawsuit because the plaintiff’s “fundamental assumption” was flawed: “that [plaintiff] had a right to know how the room service servers are paid by the hotel.”

This is as close as a published Section 17200 decision has come to throwing out a case based simply on common sense.  In this case, the court decided that engaging in a complex and expensive fact-finding process was not necessary to determine that the challenged practice was neither “unfair” nor “fraudulent.” The 4th District was willing to make that decision “as a matter of law.”  The court even appeared to rely on the opinions of the individual judges: “In the final analysis we are not offended by the hotel’s practice of treating the service charge as a means of providing reliable compensation to its employees and not as a substitute for the customary tip.” In Gregory, the 1st District refused to grant an injunction to a private attorney general who had asserted that Albertson’s had colluded with the owner of a shopping center to withdraw certain retail space from the market in order to benefit another Albertson’s location. The result of Albertson’s actions, the plaintiff argued, was urban blight.  The only issue before the court in Gregory was whether the defendants’ actions constituted an “unfair” business practice. In reaching its decision, the court decided that previous tests for determining the “unfairness” of a business practice were too vague and too broad to be useful.

The rejected tests originated in Motors Inc. v. Timers Mirror Co., 102 Cal.App.3d 735 (1980) (unfairness determined by “weighing the utility of the defendant’s conduct against the gravity of the harm to the alleged victim”), and People v. Casa Blanca Convalescent Homes, 159 Cal.App.3d 509 (1984) (business practice unfair when it “offends an established public policy or when the practice is immoral, unethical, oppressive, unscrupulous or substantially injurious to consumers”). Instead, Gregory held, where a private attorney general argues that a practice is “unfair” because it violates a public policy of the state, the private attorney general must back up its claim by tying the alleged “public policy” to a particular constitutional provision, statute or regulation.

In other words, under Gregory, a private attorney general cannot invent a “public policy” out of whole cloth and allege that the defendant’s business practice violates that policy. This case therefore narrows the range of potential “unfair” business practices and allows businesses to conform their actions more easily to the law. These cases provide Section 17200 defense counsel with new tools to attack future private attorney general claims.  For example, Rosenbluth allows defense counsel to argue more easily that certain private attorney general actions should not proceed because they are not truly brought to benefit the general public. Rosenbluth also narrows potential Section 17200 liability by discouraging private attorneys general from bringing actions to benefit sophisticated business entities. After Searle, Section 17200 defense counsel can attack cases at the outer limits of the unfair-competition law’s bounds more easily by appealing to the trial court’s common sense.  Moreover, Searle provides support for an argument that the issue of “unfairness” can be decided without the expense of pretrial discovery and other work. The Gregory court narrowed the definition of “unfairness.” Defense counsel can attack private attorney general claims allegedly based on public policy by arguing that the alleged public policy finds no support in the state’s constitution, statutes or regulations. In short, Rosenbluth, Searle and Gregory have the potential to help make the defense of private attorney general actions more successful and cost-effective, to the benefit of businesses operating in the state.

Aaron Morris is a Partner with the law firm of Morris & Stone, LLP, located in Tustin, Orange County, California. He can be reached at (714) 954-0700, or by email.  The practice areas of Morris & Stone include employment law (wrongful termination, sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination), business litigation (breach of contract, trade secret, partnership dissolution, unfair business practices, etc.), real estate and construction disputes, first amendment law, Internet law, discrimination claims, defamation suits, and legal malpractice.

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